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Book Reviews

Life and Death with Liberty and Justice
Germain Grisez and Joseph M. Boyle, Jr.
University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Ind., 1979. x + 521 pp. , $20.95.
Life and Death with Liberty and Justice is a compreh ensive critical examination by two professional philosophers of the major issues involved in the c urrent
eut hanasia debate. Grisez holds the cha ir of Christian ethics at Mount Saint Mary's
College and Seminary , Emmitsburg, Md. Boyle is currently a philosophy professo r
at the Co ll ege of Saint Thomas, Saint Paul, Minn. The book includes,13 chapters
of which chapters two through nine are devoted to a jurisprudential treatment of
the issues. In chapter two a basis for the forthcoming treatment is established on
the principl es of liberty an d justice. The discussion in ch apters t hree through nine
concerns what the appropriate legislation in the U ni ted States should be for issues
suc h as "t he definition of death , " "refusal of m ed ical treatment ," " suic ide,"
"voluntary a nd involuntary euthanasia" and "care for t he noncompetent patient."
Chapter ten considers defects in American constitutional law which were revealed
in t he earli er jurisprudential discussion. Chapters eleven and twelve examine the
principal issues from a moral or ethical point of view. In the final chapter of the
b oo k t h e authors compare and contrast their own views on the relation b etwee n
law and morali ty with utilitarianism. They also attempt to sh ow h ere how the
ethical theory establish ed in chapter eleven gives additional rational support to the
justice an d liberty jurispruden tial framework worked out in the second chapter.
Although both authors collaborated on th e entire work, Grisez appears to be
its principal a uth or. This seems to be clearly t h e situation for the jurisprudential
part of t he work. Overall, this book is a clearly written , thoroughly researched
(t hrou gh Jul y, 1977), incisive, critical analysis of t he current debate on euthanasia
from the legal and ethical perspectives. The authors make an obvious effort to give
a fair a nd temperate hearing to all sides of a particular issu e and the more than 50
pages of notes at the e nd of the book attest to the extensive research which went
into the proj ect. There is an index, but no special bibliographical section .
Although t he argu m ent developed in t he book is philosophical in character and
thus of interest to any philosopher concerned with the lega lity and morality of
questions pertinent to euthanasia, Grisez and Boyle have written especially for all
those "who doubt the wisdom of legalizing the killing of one person by another
not now permitted by Anglo-Saxon law. " The authors hope to provide these
people with a "well argued and unified strategy" for defend ing human life in the
prac tica l order as effectively as possible. The book, in brief, is a serious professio nal effort by pro-life philosophers Grisez and Boyl e to give a practical wisdom
to the pro-life movement and thereby h elp it make a substantive case in the public
arena based upon jurisprudential and ethical grounds, rath er than on' religious or
theological ones.
It is both interesting and signifi cant in light of this that the authors rest their
jurisprudentia l case on the concepts of justice and liberty rather than on the
"sanctity of life " standard usually advocate d by people in the pro-life movement.
Grisez an d Boyle believe that any use of t he latter in public debate would mak e
one vulnerable to a charge of "question begging" since there ex ists no consensus
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in American society on "the sanctity of life." Life from that perspective is simply
not a direct, immediate and absolute part of the common good, for the sake of
which Americans have forged themselves into a political entity. But a rationally
sound jurisprudence can be based upon the concepts of justice and liberty, the
authors claim, because analysis reveals that "justice - including fair respect for
liberty - is the one component of the common good that is constant and necessary." Justice with liberty is then the standard which any party to the euthanasia
jurisprudential debate must accept if it claims to argue its case in reference to the
American legal and political perspective. If Grisez and Boyle are correct in their
views that justice with liberty is a more rationally justified jurisprudential standard than "sanctity of life" and that this standard rests or is supported by a solid
ethical foundation (chapters eleven and thirteen), then the pro-life movement
would probably lose little and gain much by using "justice with liberty" rather
than "sanctity of life" as the standard for its jurisprudential arguments. With the
possible exception of some system of "living will" which could be legalized under
justice with liberty, a jurisprudence based upon the latter would appear to correspond with most other legislative objectives of the pro-life movement.
In any case, to focus critically on some major issues treated in the jurisprudential part of the book, the authors contend that a sound system of law based
upon the principles of justice and liberty will properly designate any form of
active euthanasia, whether voluntary or non voluntary , as unlawful homicide. Turning first to active voluntary euthanasia, it is argued that physicians should not be
at liberty to perform this kind of killing because at least some people not wishing
to be killed are likely to become unwilling euthanasia victims if active voluntary
euthanasia without close governmental regulation were legally permitted. These
people would obviously be unjustly denied the protection they now enjoy under
anti-homicide laws, since the denial would function to serve a private interest
alone. Grisez and Boyle, however, go beyond this familiar slippery slope or wedge
anti-euthanasia argument to make their point, by claiming that any voluntary
active euthanasia would be unjust even if it were effectively controlled under tight
government supervision. In this situation the liberty of "the many people who still
consider euthanasia killing a grave moral evil" would be unjustly infringed upon,
they argue, since the tight governmental regulation would necessarily make them
unwilling participants in a government process which functions to serve a private
interest alone.
This argument is interesting because the authors admit that something more
than the often-used slippery slope defense may be necessary to justify the
infringement of liberty effected by legislation prohibiting any form of voluntary
active euthanasia. It is not clear, however (at least not to this reviewer), that the
"something more" based upon involuntary coercion offered by Grisez and Boyle
is sufficient to plug the hole they perceive in the slippery slope argument. Would
legislation permitting active voluntary euthanasia necessarily serve private interests
solely? Do the many people referred to, who consider voluntary active euthanasia
a grave moral evil, really consider it to be a grave moral evil in all circumstances?
Or is the euthanasia context similar to the abortion one, where many of those
opposed to legalized abortion are not opposed to legalized abortion to preserve
the life of the mother? The fact that these questions can be raised meaningfully in
reference to Grisez and Boyle's argument suggests that pro-lifers who accept their
evaluation of the slippery slope defense might have to do more than is done in the
book to make a strong case against any legislation permitting active voluntary
euthanasia.
The authors supply a less problematic case when opposing legislation permitting active nonvoluntary euthanasia. They believe that a distinct argument is necessary to handle this form of euthanasia since they admit that the killing to be done
in this context could possibly serve a public interest. It could, for example, cut
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the high costs incurred from providing health care to noncompetent citizens who
are seriously ill and show no reasonable promise for improvement. Two substantive reasons are given which show why any legalized killing of this sort would
necessarily be unjust. In the first place, all the various kinds of killing in AngloAmerican law which have jurisprudential justification to do so because the killing
either "protects the rights of others and the rule of law from being overridden by
brute force " or it "provides the best possibility of survival when some members of
a group must be sacrificed to save the lives of others." Obviously none of these
contexts provide any precedent for legalizing the killing involved in active nonvoluntary euthanasia. Secondly and, I think, decisively, any institutionalization of
active nonvoluntary euthanasia will function unjustly from an arbitrary cutoff
point differentiating those to be killed from those to be saved, as well as from an
arbitrary discrimination in the practical application of the category which permits
the killing of borderline cases.
In the ethical component of the book, it is clear that Grisez and Boyle give no
quarter whatsoever when arguing the issues of euthanasia from the moral or
ethical perspective in chapters eleven and twelve. For them, any proposal to bring
about death as a means to end suffering, whether by om ission or commission, is, if
adopted and executed, an instance of killing in the strict sense and can never be
morally justified. This contention is especially tough-minded because in addition
to condemning active euthanasia it also means that any instance of withholding or
withdrawing treatment which has been decided upon because "the patient will be
better off dead" is also a killing not justified from the moral point of view,
regardless of the good wills of the people involved. If Grisez and Boyle are correct
here , then possibly some, and perhaps much of what is accepted in our society as
morally justified so-called passive euthanasia is simply no different objectively
from any other moral act of murder.
This moral position on euthanasia derives basically from two factors : a fundamental normative moral principle and the basic intrinsic goodness of human life.
The fundamental normative principle is this: "one ought always to act on these
potentialities conducive to fuller and fullest self-fulfillment" and it is naturally
rooted in the normativeness of all the basic human goods taken together. The
authors argue that human goods as such ground this principle because each good
in itself is not only an obvious value, existing in reference to the network of
human potentiality for self-flourishing, but is also a value which is incommensurable. Thus, all basic human goods are qualitatively equal with no one of them
being the inferior or superior of any others, at least not in the practical order. The
feature of incommensurability involved here is established from the fact of free
choice. If basic human goods were qualitatively different one would be psychologically determined in a given context to choose the best: "what one ought to do
will be identical with what one will do." The fact of the matter, however - the
fact of freedom - is that one is perfectly capable of doing other than what he or
she knows ought to be done. Thus what provides the fatal blow to all consequentialist ethical theories opens the door for the basic principle of natural law: act
always in ways which are open to the basic human goods and never act in ways
which violate any of them (precisely because each is an incommensurable good).
The argument to establish the basic normative principle involved here is more a
crystallization of positions Grisez and Boyle have developed in earlier writings
than it is something completely new. In fact, some of these earlier writings have
already generated a chall enge from pro-life ethicists who, while admitting in principle Grisez's and Boyl e 's point on incommensurability, deny that basic human
goods are necessarily incommensurable in every context.
Grisez and Boyle think that their claim about the intrinsic goodness of human
life is true because the opposing view - that it is an extrinsic good necessary for
the possession of the basic goods, such as knowledge of truth and experience of
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beauty - entails dualism and dualism is a false position. F ew people will deny that
dualism is false, but dualism may be a red h erring here . Perhaps the point at issue
re ally concerns the extent to which the human biological body as we know it is an
intrinsic good of a human person. It appears that for Grisez and Boyle the cover·
age extends to the entire biological body: arms and legs, heart and lungs. The
compelling quality of their account may not be seen or felt , however, as one looks
for the intrinsic good in the total human biological body of the self-respirating but
brain-damaged person who is living out his life in an irreversible comatose state.
The service that Grisez and Boyle provide to the pro-life movement through
Life and Death with Liberty and Justice should be reiterated. It will surely be
advantageous for furthering pro-life objectives if people within the movement give
the book the careful study it deserves.
- Patrick J. Coffey, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Philosophy
Marquette University

Principles of Biomedical Ethics
Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress
Oxford University Press, New York, N. Y., 1979. x + 314 pp., $7. 95 (paper).
Principles of Biomedical Ethics is an innovative book. Until now , most efforts
to treat the full range of moral issues in medicine from the standpoint of a
systematic moral theory have been provided by authors writing in one of the
major theological traditions. This volume represents an attempt by moralists with
scholarly facility in 20th century philosophical ethics to construct a set of moral
principles for use in analyzing a broad spectrum of ethical dilemmas in health
care. The philosophical elegance of the principles is commendable. Somewhat less
satisfactory, however, is the manner in which the principles are applied to clinical
medicine. What the volume seems to lack is a firm sense for some important
philosophical lessons regarding the physician-patient relationship which clinical
experience provides.
The authors propose to examine medico-moral issues primarily from the perspective of four principles: autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence and justice.
Certain other principles, sometimes thought to be sui generis, are derived from
some member of this set. For example, the duty of veracity is derived from the
principle of autonomy. Autonomy requires consent by the patient or subject, and
"consent cannot express autonomy unless it is informed , and it therefore depends
on communication and ultimately on truthtelling" (p. 203). However, duties of
fidelity, which are also a significant feature of professional-patient relationships,
are created by voluntary actions such as the making of contracts. Oftentimes they
"hinge on the terms of the relationship itself rather than on external principles"
(p. 201). The various principles formulate prima facie duties - th ey indicate
duties that "are on all occasions binding unless they are in co n flict wi t h stronger
duties" (p. 45). Thus, the interpretation of principles, as well as some of their
content, derives from W. D. Ross.
Each of the centrally important middle chapters focuses u pon one of the four
major principles. In each case, the relevant principle is explicate d and then used to
examine bioethical issues to which it is deemed to be most relevant. Although the

February, 1980

91

